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The present review addresses the physiological correlates of planning effects on
behavior. Although intentions to act qualify as predictors of behavior, accumulated
evidence indicates that there is a substantial gap between even strong intentions
and subsequent action. One effective strategy to reduce this intention–behavior gap
is the formation of implementation intentions that specify when, where, and how to
act on a given goal in an if-then format (“If I encounter situation Y, then I will initiate
action Z!”). It has been proposed that implementation intentions render the mental
representation of the situation highly accessible and establish a strong associative link
between the mental representations of the situation and the action. These process
assumptions have been examined in behavioral research, and in physiological research,
a field that has begun to investigate the temporal dynamics of and brain areas
involved in implementation intention effects. In the present review, we first summarize
studies on the cognitive processes that are central to the strategic automation of
action control by implementation intentions. We then examine studies involving critical
samples with impaired self-regulation. Lastly, we review studies that have applied
physiological measures such as heart rate, cortisol level, and eye movement, as well
as electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies on the neural correlates of implementation intention effects. In support of the
assumed processes, implementation intentions increased goal attainment in studies on
cognitive processes and in critical samples, modulated brain waves related to perceptual
and decision processes, and generated less activity in brain areas associated with
effortful action control. In our discussion, we reflect on the status quo of physiological
research on implementation intentions, methodological and conceptual issues, related
research, and propose future directions.
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Introduction
“The road to hell is paved with good intentions” is a popular
proverb that illustrates a potential obstacle during action control:
people may form adequate intentions but fail to translate these
intentions into action. Indeed, research has observed a pervasive
gap between people’s intended and actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991,
2012; Armitage and Conner, 2001; Sheeran, 2002). Examples of
such intention–behavior gaps can be found in various domains
including intentions to exercise more (meta-analysis by Bélanger-
Gravel et al., 2013) or to eat more healthily (meta-analysis by
Adriaanse et al., 2011b), intentions to be more careful with
the disclosure of personal information during interpersonal
communication (Norberg et al., 2007), and intentions to make
ethical purchases (Carrington et al., 2014).
From Intention to Action
Humans regulate their behavior by setting goals and then
acting toward them (overview by Fishbach and Ferguson,
2007). The ﬁeld of social and personality psychology as
well as the ﬁeld of human cognitive neuroscience both
deﬁne goals as mental representations of desired endstates
(Braver et al., 2014). While the former domain emphasizes
considerations of feasibility, desirability, commitment, and
beliefs, the latter focuses on the active maintenance of these
representations. Aside from these diﬀerent accentuations, the
two research ﬁelds thus share a similar conceptual starting
point that allows the comparison and integration of behavioral
and physiological ﬁndings on the intentional control of
action.
To investigate the causal impact of intentions on action, Webb
and Sheeran (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of behavioral
experiments that manipulated the strength of the intention
(i.e., induced either high or low goal commitment). Because
participants were assigned randomly to one of these conditions,
these research designs make third-variable explanations highly
unlikely, allowing causal conclusions to be drawn. The analysis
revealed that a medium-to-large (Cohen, 1992) change in
commitment (d = 0.66) only led to a small-to-medium change
in the respective behavior (d = 0.33), suggesting that forming
strong intentions (i.e., forming high goal commitment) is not
suﬃcient for goal attainment. A related meta-analysis showed
that this gap is largely due to people who are strongly committed
but fail to act on their intentions (Sheeran, 2002). Consequently,
there is a gap between strong intentions and actual behavior such
that even strong goal intentions do not ensure successful goal
attainment.
Planning with Implementation Intentions:
Effects and Processes
An eﬀective and easily applicable self-regulation strategy for
supporting people in their eﬀorts to translate goal intentions into
action is planning when, where, and how they want to act toward
a goal in an if-then format (e.g., “If I encounter situation Y, then I
will initiate action Z!”). Forming such implementation intentions
(Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999, 2014) supports individuals (Gollwitzer
and Sheeran, 2006) as well as groups (Wieber et al., 2012, 2013;
Thürmer et al., 2015a) in their eﬀorts to reduce their intention-
behavior gaps. For instance, the meta-analysis by Gollwitzer and
Sheeran (2006) involving more than 8,000 participants in 94
independent studies observed that implementation intentions
have a medium-to-large average eﬀect on goal attainment
(d = 0.65). This is especially remarkable as most of the included
studies compared an implementation intention condition to a
control condition that formed goal intentions, which already
beneﬁt goal attainment (Webb and Sheeran, 2006).
The eﬀectiveness of implementation intentions is assumed
to be based on two processes (Gollwitzer, 1999; overview by
Gollwitzer and Oettingen, 2011). First, the mental representation
of the situation speciﬁed in the if-part becomes highly
accessible once the respective goal is activated. Second, a
strong associative link between the mental representation of
the situation and the mental representation of the action
speciﬁed in the then-part is established. As a result, individuals
should show heightened perceptual readiness regarding the
critical situation and should therefore initiate the linked
action eﬃciently, immediately, and without requiring further
conscious intent. Metaphorically speaking, forming an if-then
plan thus strategically automates goal striving by shifting
from top–down to bottom–up information processing. People
intentionally delegate control of goal-directed behavior to
preselected situational cues, with the explicit purpose of attaining
their goals.
The Present Review
In the present review, we ﬁrst report studies on the cognitive
processes. As there is considerable overlap between the
paradigms used in these behavioral studies on cognitive
processes and those applied in physiological studies, these
studies imply new physiological hypotheses and can inspire the
design of new physiological studies. Subsequently, we review
behavioral studies that have examined critical samples with
self-regulation impairments, as these studies can also inform
research on the cognitive and physiological processes underlying
implementation intention eﬀects. We then present studies
using physiological measures that exemplify how physiological
measures including cortisol level, heart rate, and eye movement
recordings as well as electrocortical and neuroimaging measures
can contribute to our understanding of implementation intention
eﬀects.
Although we aim to provide a comprehensive review, a
complete review of the large number of implementation intention
studies is beyond the scope of this review. We have selected
studies that we believe are central to the implementation
intention literature and methodologically as well as conceptually
most informative for physiological research (see Table 1). In
order to include as many studies as possible in a limited amount
of space, we only describe exemplary studies in detail. In the
ﬁrst two sections on cognitive processes and critical samples,
we brieﬂy summarize this research and refer to the relevant
literature. As physiological processes represent the focus of the
present review and as the number of related implementation
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TABLE 1 | Overview of the studies featured in the present review.
Study Study focus Paradigms Main outcomes: implementation intention effects
Studies on cognitive processes
Aarts et al. (1999) Priming Lexical decision task,
Coupon pick up
Faster responses to critical cues that mediated implementation intention
effects on remembering to pick up a coupon
Webb and Sheeran (2007,
2008)
Priming (sequential) Lexical decision task,
Word-search puzzles/
Coupon pick up
Faster responses to critical cues and
faster responses to response-related words when preceded by critical
cues that both mediated implementation intention effects on behavior
Brandstätter et al. (2001,
Studies 3 and 4)
Automaticity: efficiency and
immediacy
Dual-task (Meaningless
syllables or Tracking task/
Go/no-go task)
Faster go-responses to critical cues in the go/no-go task without
impaired meaningless syllables task performance (Study 3) or tracking
task performance (Study 4)
Gollwitzer and
Brandstätter (1997)
Automaticity: immediacy Counter-argumentation task Reduced time differences between intending to speak up during a
conversation and actually speaking up
Bayer et al. (2009) Automaticity: redundancy of
conscious intent
Lexical decision task Faster reading aloud of response-related words and faster response
initiation after subliminal presentation of critical cues
Achtziger et al. (2012,
Study 1)
Selective attention (auditory) Dichotic listening task Reduced performance on the attended headphone channel when critical
cues were presented on the unattended headphone channel
Wieber and Sassenberg
(2006)
Selective attention (visual) Lexical decision/Flanker task,
Letter detection task
Slower lexical decisions when words/non-words were flanked by critical
cues
Slow-downs were related to better letter-detection performance
Janczyk et al. (2015) Selective attention (visual) Psychological refractory
period (PRP) task
Faster responses to Task 2 stimuli for long – but not short – stimulus
onset asynchronies
Achtziger et al. (2012,
Study 2)
Memory Recall task Improved recall of critical cues after 15 min and 2 days
Chen et al. (2015) Meta-analysis on prospective
memory
Several prospective memory
tasks
Improved prospective memory performance in adults, and (sub-)clinical
populations
Slower responses in the ongoing task
Cohen et al. (2008) Control of automatic
processes (executive control)
Simon task, switch task Reduced switch costs in the switch task
Minimized influence of spatial location in the Simon task for the critical cue
Stewart and Payne (2008) Control of automatic
processes (stereotyping)
Shooter task
Implicit association test (IAT)
Reduced automatic stereotyping, as indicated by the process
dissociation procedure
Faster responses in stereotype-incongruent trials and slower responses
to stereotype- congruent IAT trials
Mendoza et al. (2010) Control of automatic
processes (stereotyping)
Shooter task Reduced behavioral expression of implicit stereotypes, reduced automatic
stereotype activation by distraction-inhibiting implementation intentions
Webb et al. (2012a) Control of automatic
processes (implicit attitudes)
General knowledge test,
Verb identification test
Reduced unhelpful effects of primed social categories and goals
Webb et al. (2012b) Control of automatic
processes (implicit attitudes)
IAT,
Go/no-go association task
Faster responses to attitude-incongruent trials in implicit attitude tests
Adriaanse et al. (2011a) Control of automatic
processes (habits)
Lexical decision task Faster responses to non-habitual means
Wieber et al. (2014) Control of automatic
processes (social influence)
Mimicking task, spending
task
Restored the positive effects of mimicking for an unlikable person
Shielded individuals’ saving goal when a mimicking person challenged it
Studies with critical samples
Lengfelder and Gollwitzer
(2001)
Individuals with frontal lesions Go/no-go task Faster responses to critical cue go-trials in individuals with frontal brain
lesions
McFarland and Glisky
(2011)
Community-dwelling older
adults
Prospective memory task Reduced number of forgotten prospective memory responses for
individuals with low as well as high frontal-lobe function (as measured by
several tests including the mental arithmetic test from the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale – Revised)
Brom et al. (2014) Community-dwelling older
adults
Regular blood pressure
monitoring, Intelligence
subscale
Reduced number of forgotten blood pressure tests in participants with
low fluid intelligence (i.e., poor performance digit symbol subtask from the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale)
Brom and Kliegel (2014) Community-dwelling older
adults
Regular blood pressure
monitoring, Switch task
Reduced number of forgotten blood pressure tests in participants with
limited executive abilities (i.e., high mixing costs in a switch task)
Brandstätter et al. (2001,
Study 1)
Opiate addicts in withdrawal Composing a CV in 7 h Increased completion rates for the CV task in opiate addicts in withdrawal
Brandstätter et al. (2001,
Study 2)
Individuals with schizophrenia Go/no-go task Faster responses to critical cue go-trials in individuals with schizophrenia
(Continued)
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 395
Wieber et al. Physiological correlates of implementation intentions
TABLE 1 | Continued
Study Study focus Paradigms Main outcomes: implementation intention effects
Chen et al., 2014 Individuals with schizotypal
personality
Prospective memory task Faster responses to ongoing N-back task and reduced number of
forgotten key presses in response to the four prospective memory target
words
Kardiasmenos et al.
(2008)
Individuals with multiple
sclerosis
Prospective memory task Reduced number of forgotten prospective memory tasks during a “Virtual
Week” board game
Grilli and McFarland
(2011)
Memory-impaired individuals Prospective memory task Reduced number of forgotten prospective memory tasks during a general
knowledge test in memory-impaired individuals with neurological damage
Brown et al. (2009) Individuals with epilepsy Medication adherence Improved medication adherence
O’Carroll et al. (2013) Stroke survivors Medication adherence Improved medication adherence
Gawrilow et al. (2011a) Children with Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD)
Computerized
delay-of-gratification task
Improved delay of gratification
Gawrilow and Gollwitzer
(2008)
Children with ADHD Go/no-go task Improved inhibition of unwanted responses in no-go trials,
implementation intentions added to the beneficial effects of
psychostimulant medication on response inhibition
Gawrilow et al. (2011b) Children with ADHD Modified WCST,
Resistance to distractions
task
Reduced executive functioning deficit, as indicated by better performance
on modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and on math problems
with distractions
Studies using physiological measures
Paul et al. (2007) Children with ADHD Go/no-go task,
electroencephalography
(EEG)
Improved response control (i.e., fewer inhibition errors following no-go
trials) and increased P 300 component (i.e., no reduced no-go/go
amplitude differences during the first half of the P 300 component) in
children with ADHD, better inhibition correlated with higher no-go/go
amplitude difference
Scholz et al. (2009) Executive functioning under
stress
Go/no-go task, cortisol level,
heart rate
Improved go/no-go task under conditions of acute stress [i.e., Trierer
Social Stress Test (TSST) leading to increased levels of cortisol, heart rate,
and state anxiety]
Stalbovs et al. (2015) Learning processes Multimedia learning
performance, eye-tracking
Improved multimedia learning outcomes by fostering text-picture
integration (more gaze transitions between text and picture as measured
by eye-tracking)
Schweiger Gallo et al.
(2009)
Emotion regulation (spider
fear)
Affective picture evaluation
task, EEG
Reduced negative affect when viewing spider pictures and lower positivity
of P100 component (i.e., down-modulation of the high positivitiy
characterizing the responses to highly arousing negative stimuli) in
individuals with fear of spiders
Hallam et al. (2015) Emotion regulation (sadness
and disgust)
Affective picture evaluation
task, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI)
Reduced negative affect when viewing disgusting and sad pictures, more
activation of right inferior frontal gyrus and ventro-parietal cortex, more
effective modulation of left amygdala, lower self-reported affect
corresponded with relatively reduced left amygdala activity (coupling of
orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala)
Gilbert et al. (2009) Brain activity during
self-initiated vs. cued
responding
Prospective memory tasks,
fMRI
Greater percentage of detected prospective memory cues, no increase in
activity in a predominantly frontoparietal network, responses to targets
yielded greater activity in rostal prefrontal cortex (medial BA 10), difference
in target-related BA 10 activity mirrored differences in behavior between
intentions
intention studies to date is small, in the third section we
comprehensively describe all of the implementation intention
studies using physiological measures that we are aware of.
Studies on Cognitive Processes
To examine the cognitive processes underlying implementation
intention eﬀects, various approaches from the literature on social-
cognitive automatic processes (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000;
Bargh et al., 2012) have been used: cognitive tasks such as
sequential priming paradigms, dual-task paradigms, attention
paradigms, and memory paradigms, as well as paradigms that
focus on the control of ostensibly uncontrollable phenomena.
These paradigms originated in diﬀerent research traditions, and
each allows the examination of a diﬀerent facet of the processes
underlying implementation intention eﬀects. In the following, we
review the research on priming, automaticity, selective attention,
memory, and the control of automatic processes.
Priming
Several studies have investigated the cognitive mechanisms
underlying implementation intention eﬀects using priming
paradigms (Aarts et al., 1999; Webb and Sheeran, 2007, 2008).
In general, priming paradigms make use of the fact that the prior
presentation of a stimulus facilitates the subsequent identiﬁcation
and classiﬁcation of the same or a closely related target
stimulus (Neely, 1991). To examine the assumed implementation
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intention processes, researchers have used lexical decision tasks
in which participants are asked to decide whether a presented
letter string represents a meaningful word or not. According to
the logic of this task, faster responses to a target word (relative to
neutral words) indicate the increased accessibility of the mental
representation of this word.
An initial study by Aarts et al. (1999) focused on the
process assumption that implementation intentions increase
the accessibility of the critical cue that is speciﬁed in the if-
component. Participants formed the goal to collect a food coupon
on their way from the laboratory to the cafeteria and either
added an implementation intention specifying when, where, and
how they would pick up the coupon or not. Next, participants
worked on a lexical decision task that contained ﬁve target
words describing the situation speciﬁed in the plan. Subsequently,
participants were sent to the cafeteria, and it was assessed
whether they collected the coupon or not. Implementation
intention participants responded more quickly to the target
words in the lexical decision task and were signiﬁcantly more
successful in collecting the coupon (80%) than mere goal
intention participants (50%). Importantly, a mediation analysis
revealed that the eﬀect of planning on actually collecting the
coupon was no longer signiﬁcant when the response times for
target words were included as a covariate. As faster responses to
target words indicate that implementation intentions increased
the accessibility of the critical cues, this mediation suggests that
the increased accessibility helped participants to translate their
intentions into action.
In a second study, Webb and Sheeran (2007) also examined
the second process assumption (i.e., that implementation
intentions increase the strength of the cue-response link) using a
sequential priming paradigm. All participants formed the goal to
respond correctly and as fast as possible to words and non-words.
Implementation intention participants additionally formed the
plan to “press” the non-word button especially fast whenever
they encountered the non-word “avenda.” Control participants
familiarized themselves with this word for 30 s to keep levels
of familiarity and mental rehearsal equal across conditions.
Next, a lexical decision task measured cognitive processes and
24 word-search puzzles measured participants’ behavior. In
the lexical decision task, a subliminally presented (i.e., for
17 ms) prime preceded each target stimulus. In line with the
hypotheses, implementation intentions accelerated participants’
responses when an “avenda” prime preceded the “press” target
(i.e., cue-response link) and when a neutral word preceded the
“avenda” target (i.e., heightened accessibility of the critical cue).
Moreover, participants with implementation intentions detected
the non-word “avenda” more quickly than control participants
in the subsequent word-search puzzles. Most importantly, a
mediation analysis revealed that both types of acceleration
contributed to the implementation intention eﬀect on puzzle
performance. These ﬁndings corroborate the assumption that
both the heightened cue accessibility and the strengthened cue-
response link contribute to implementation intention eﬀects.
A third study (Webb and Sheeran, 2008) replicated and
extended these eﬀects using the Aarts et al. (1999) paradigm.
This research demonstrated the simultaneous mediation of
implementation intention eﬀects by both cue accessibility
and the cue-response link: again, implementation intentions
helped participants to collect a coupon, and this eﬀect was
simultaneously mediated by the acceleration of their responses
when critical cue primes preceded critical response targets and
when neutral primes preceded critical cue targets. Overall, the
ﬁndings from the reported priming studies validate the assumed
roles of cue accessibility and the strength of cue-response
associations in the eﬀectiveness of implementation intentions.
Automaticity
In addition to these ﬁndings, another set of behavioral studies
speaks to the cognitive processes underlying implementation
intention eﬀects, namely studies that have investigated whether
action control by implementation intentions involves features
that characterize automatic action control (Bargh, 1994; Bargh
et al., 2012). Three features of automaticity have been tested: the
eﬃciency of action control, the immediacy of response initiation,
and the redundancy of a further conscious intent to act once the
critical situation is encountered.
Eﬃciency
To test the assumption that action initiation by implementation
intentions is eﬃcient, Brandstätter et al. (2001, Studies 3 and 4)
examined whether implementation intentions would also speed
up action initiation under conditions of increased mental
load using dual-task paradigms. In the elaborate paradigm
of Study 4, participants simultaneously worked on a primary
tracking task and a secondary go/no-go task. Both tasks
involved the same modalities (i.e., visual input and motor
responses) in order to ensure that they would draw on the
same limited cognitive resources. Consequently, a performance
improvement in the secondary task only qualiﬁes as an
increase in eﬃciency when it does not impair performance
in the primary task. In line with this logic, implementation
intention participants responded more quickly to critical stimuli
in go-trials of the secondary task than control participants
while performing equally well on the primary task. Similarly,
a study on the consequences of forming implementation
intentions observed that implementation intentions that aﬀect
goal striving by facilitating the response initiation did not
impair the consideration of alternative goal-directed responses
(Parks-Stamm et al., 2007, Study 2). Thus, action control by
implementation intentions can be characterized as eﬃcient.
Immediacy
The dual-task studies conducted by Brandstätter et al. (2001,
Studies 3 and 4) also provide evidence for the immediacy of
action control by implementation intentions: implementation
intention participants responded faster to the critical stimulus
than goal intention participants. However, the immediacy of
the pre-planned response has also been tested in a more
social-psychological setting using a confrontational conversation
paradigm (Gollwitzer and Brandstätter, 1997). This paradigm
utilizes the importance of responding immediately in social
contexts by examining how long participants take to counter
unacceptable remarks by others. In the study, participants
watched a video of a confederate making xenophobic statements.
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Before they viewed this video a second time, they were asked to
select scenes that they personally considered to be particularly
suitable for presenting counterarguments by pressing a button
and to either form implementation intentions to speak up at each
of the selected scenes or not. After selecting scenes in the second
run, participants’ task in the third run was to interrupt the video
when a selected scene shows up and to actually comment on a
statement. The time diﬀerence between the onset of the selected
scenes and actually pressing the button served as an indicator
of the immediacy of seizing the preselected opportunities. As
predicted, implementation intention participants spoke up more
quickly after the marked scenes (i.e., more immediately) than
control participants. These ﬁndings provide support for the
hypothesis that action control by implementation intentions is
automatic in terms of the immediacy of action initiation.
Redundancy of conscious intent
The assumption that implementation intentions can trigger
action once the critical situation is encountered without requiring
further conscious intent was tested by Bayer et al. (2009). In
these studies, subliminally presented implementation intention
cues accelerated the reading aloud of response-related words (i.e.,
action preparation; Bayer et al., 2009, Study 1) and the initiation
of the actual responses (i.e., action initiation; Bayer et al.,
2009, Study 2). These ﬁndings corroborate the assumption that
forming an implementation intention delegates’ action control
to environmental stimuli, which then trigger the linked response
without requiring further conscious intent.
Selective Attention
In addition to the research on priming and the automation of
action control by implementation intentions, other studies have
focused on the question of whether implementation intentions
also aﬀect attentional processes. To measure implementation
intention eﬀects on attention, behavioral paradigms focusing on
auditory (Achtziger et al., 2012, Study 1), and visual selective
attention (Wieber and Sassenberg, 2006) have been applied. In
both paradigms, participants work on a focal task while the
implementation intention cues are presented as distractors. The
extent to which performance on the focal task is impaired by
the presence of critical cues relative to neutral cues indicates the
attraction of attention by implementation intentions.
To investigate auditory attention, participants in a dichotic
listening task study (Achtziger et al., 2012, Study 1) were asked
to repeat the words that were played on one channel of their
headphones (i.e., the attended channel) while simultaneously
ignoring words presented on the other channel (i.e., the
unattended channel). The unattended channel presented cues
from a self-generated implementation intention that participants
had formed 1 day earlier in an ostensibly unrelated study. These
cues increased latencies in repeating the words from the attended
channel as well as error rates. To test visual attention, participants
in a ﬂanker task study (Wieber and Sassenberg, 2006) were
asked to respond to focal cues while ignoring task-irrelevant
ﬂankers that were presented alongside. For instance, in Study 2,
presenting the critical implementation intention cue “d” as task-
irrelevant ﬂankers slowed categorization responses to the focal
cues, and this slowdown predicted the number of critical letters
“d” participants detected in a subsequent letter detection task.
In addition, a set of experimental studies by Janczyk et al.
(2015) investigated implementation intention eﬀects on visual
attention in greater detail by using a Psychological Refractory
Period (PRP) paradigm (Pashler, 1994). This paradigm utilizes
the established division of task processing into a pre-central
perceptual stage, a central stage of response selection, and a
post-central motor stage. Whereas the perceptual and motor
stages are assumed to run in parallel with other processes, the
central stage is not (i.e., central bottleneck assumption). In the
PRP paradigm, participants simultaneously work on two tasks
in each trial. Both tasks consist of distinct stimuli (S1 vs. S2)
that require diﬀerent responses (R1 vs. R2). The time diﬀerence
between the onset of the stimuli S1 and S2 is referred to as
the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). According to the central
bottleneck assumption, short SOAs should delay responses to
the secondary task (i.e., cognitive slack), as Task 2 must wait for
Task 1 to pass through the central response selection stage. For
long SOAs, however, no such cognitive slack should occur, as
the central task-processing stages do not overlap. Assuming that
implementation intentions aﬀect the pre-central perceptual stage,
no diﬀerences between implementation intentions specifying
how to respond to a stimulus in Task 2 (i.e., forced-choice trials)
and control task instructions (i.e., free-choice trials) should be
observed, as any diﬀerences should be covered by the cognitive
slack of short SOAs. For long SOAs, however, there should be
no cognitive slack to cover diﬀerences at the perceptual stage,
and thus the implementation intention eﬀects on perception
should translate into faster responses in Task 2. In line with
this reasoning, implementation intention participants responded
faster than control participants to Task 2 stimuli for long SOAs
but not for short SOAs.
In sum, evidence from behavioral paradigms focusing on
both auditory and visual selective attention indicates that
implementation intentions aﬀect perceptual and attentional
processes. This is in accordance with the assumption that
implementation intentions facilitate the detection of the speciﬁed
situational cues. The fact that these eﬀects took the form of
diminished performance in the dichotic listening task (Achtziger
et al., 2012, Study 1) and the ﬂanker task (Wieber and Sassenberg,
2006) also points to the uncontrollability of these eﬀects, which is
another feature characterizing automatic processes (Bargh, 1994;
Bargh et al., 2012).
Memory
Implementation intention eﬀects on memory have also been
examined. For instance, (Achtziger et al., 2012, Study 2) tested the
assumption that forming implementation intentions improves
the recognition of anticipated situations using a recall paradigm.
They observed better recall of implementation intention cues
relative to the recall of non-speciﬁed cues both 15 min and
2 days after the formation of the if-then plan. In addition
to these memory-enhancing eﬀects, research on prospective
memory has examined whether implementation intentions can
help overcome the gap between intention formation and delayed
enactment. Prospective memory refers to remembering to
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perform a planned action at a future point in time (Einstein
and McDaniel, 1990; McDaniel and Einstein, 2000; Brandimonte
et al., 2014). From a prospective memory perspective, forming
implementation intentions thus qualiﬁes as a speciﬁc method of
intention encoding. Beyond these conceptual similarities, there
is also an overlap with regard to the paradigms that have been
employed to examine the eﬀects of implementation intentions
and prospective memory. Similar to the dual-task paradigms used
to investigate the eﬃciency of implementation intentions, typical
prospective memory paradigms combine an ongoing primary
task with a secondary task. However, whereas the secondary
tasks in the research on eﬃciency require continuous responses,
the secondary tasks in prospective memory research require
responses to prospective memory stimuli that are presented
only sporadically. For example, participants perform a working
memory task that asks them to recall the last three words
presented on the screen whenever the word RECALL appears,
and, as a second task, they are asked to write the day of the week
in the upper right-hand corner of each sheet of paper they receive
(Chasteen et al., 2001). Relative to regular encoding methods that
do not employ the if-then format, implementation intentions
improved prospective memory performance with a medium
eﬀect size of d = 0.45 (meta-analysis of 36 studies by Chen et al.,
2015). With regard to the processes involved, implementation
intentions slowed down responses in the ongoing task though
the eﬀect size was small (d = 0.22). Although the source
of these slowdowns has not yet been clariﬁed, these costs of
implementation intentions for the ongoing task suggest that
implementation intention eﬀects on prospective memory are not
solely automatic but involve a complex interaction of automatic
and controlled processes (see Bugg et al., 2013; Burkard et al.,
2014; Chen et al., 2015).
Control of Automatic Processes
A ﬁnal set of behavioral studies provides insights into the
automaticity of implementation intention eﬀects by examining
whether they can control phenomena that are known to be
automatic. These automatic phenomena are usually not amenable
to deliberate intentional control; successfully controlling them
would thus indicate that action control by implementation
intentions is automatic. In accordance with the horse-race
metaphor (Dunbar and MacLeod, 1984), implementation
intentions might outrun competing automatic processes. In an
application of this reasoning, implementation intentions have
been examined in various cognitive and social-psychological
paradigms that are characterized by their high stability (i.e.,
the eﬀects are diﬃcult to change). However, because such
modiﬁcations of automated processes do not seem promising as
a starting point for physiological research on implementation
intentions, we will only brieﬂy review these ﬁndings. In support
of the automaticity of action control by implementation
intentions, they improved cognitive control performance in
Simon tasks and in task switching paradigms (Cohen et al.,
2008); they allowed participants to control automatic stereotype
activation (Stewart and Payne, 2008), stereotype application
(Mendoza et al., 2010), eﬀects of primed social categories
and goals (Webb et al., 2012a), and implicit attitudes (Webb
et al., 2012b); and they enabled participants to break unwanted
snacking habits (Adriaanse et al., 2011a) and to resist unwanted
social inﬂuences (i.e., eﬀects of being mimicked; Wieber et al.,
2014).
Summary
We reviewed a variety of behavioral approaches that sought to
provide insights into the cognitive processes that characterize
action control by implementation intentions. In support of
implementation intention theory, implementation intentions
have been found to facilitate the detection of critical cues
as well as the initiation of the associated responses after the
respective cues. Moreover, implementation intention eﬀects
have been shown to be automatic in terms of their eﬃciency,
immediacy, and the redundancy of further conscious intent.
Finally, implementation intentions have been demonstrated
to aﬀect both attentional and memory processes and to be
capable of controlling automatic processes. Behavioral studies
have thus provided multi-faceted insights into the cognitive
processes underlying implementation intention eﬀects. However,
implementation intention theory can also be informed by
behavioral studies in another way – namely, by taking into
account implementation intention studies with critical samples.
Studies with Critical Samples
To explore the prerequisites of implementation intention
eﬀects and to determine who can beneﬁt from forming
implementation intentions, studies have been conducted with
critical samples that are known to experience diﬃculties with
self-regulating their actions. In support of the assumption that
implementation intentions automate action control, a recent
meta-analysis of implementation intention eﬀects in individuals
with mental-health problems (Toli et al., in press) found
that implementation intentions had a large-sized eﬀect on
goal attainment (d+ = 0.99). In 29 experimental studies with
1,636 participants, implementation intentions proved eﬀective
across diﬀerent mental-health problems and goals. In the
following section, we discuss selected studies from this meta-
analysis, including individuals with frontal-lobe lesions, opiate
addicts experiencing withdrawal, individuals with schizophrenia,
and children with Attention Deﬁcit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), but also other studies with critical samples that can
inform physiological research on implementation intentions,
such as older adults with limited executive abilities, individuals
with multiple sclerosis, memory-impaired individuals with
neurological damage, and individuals suﬀering from epilepsy or
the eﬀects of strokes.
Adult Samples with Reduced Frontal-Lobe Function
One of the brain areas that havemost consistently been associated
with action control is the prefrontal cortex (reviews by Shallice,
1988; Passingham, 1993; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Alvarez and
Emory, 2006; Heatherton and Wagner, 2011; Stuss and Knight,
2013; Casey, 2015). Corroborating this assumption, Lengfelder
and Gollwitzer (2001, Study 1) found that participants with
frontal-lobe lesions performed worse on a deliberation task (i.e.,
weighing the pros and cons of diﬀerent decision alternatives)
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than participants with non-frontal-lobe injuries and control
participants. In a further experiment (Lengfelder and Gollwitzer,
2001, Study 2), the researchers argued that self-regulation
through implementation intentions should require less activity
in frontal areas than deliberate action control by mere goals
and should therefore support action control in individuals with
brain-injuries. In line with this reasoning, frontal-lobe patients,
non-frontal-lobe patients, and student controls all responded
more quickly in the secondary task (go/no-go task) of a dual task
paradigm when encountering a critical target (i.e., the number 3)
that was speciﬁed in an implementation intention. Indeed,
patients with a low performance on the Tower of Hanoi problem-
solving task, a common measure of the capability for deliberate
action control, proﬁted the most from forming implementation
intentions.
Further support for the assumption that implementation
intentions do not require high frontal-lobe function to improve
goal attainment comes from studies involving community-
dwelling older adults (meta-analysis by Chen et al., 2015).
McFarland and Glisky (2011) observed that older adults with
high and low frontal-lobe function proﬁted alike from forming
implementation intentions for an event-based prospective
memory task. Brom and Kliegel (2014) and Brom et al. (2014)
also found that implementation intentions helped community-
dwelling older adults to remember their intention to measure
their blood pressure regularly throughout the day. However,
they observed that these implementation intention eﬀects were
moderated by participants’ cognitive abilities (ﬂuid mechanics;
Brom et al., 2014) and executive control (task switching;
Brom and Kliegel, 2014), such that implementation intentions
particularly helped participants with low rather than high ﬂuid
intelligence and task switching abilities. Interestingly, the study
conducted by Brom and Kliegel (2014) compared the impact
of two diﬀerent interventions on prospective memory tasks.
In addition to an implementation intention condition that
was intended to reduce the executive demand posed by the
prospective memory task, another intervention was designed to
train the executive functions needed for prospective memory (i.e.,
task switching). Their results indicate that task-switching training
was eﬀective at improving this particular executive function, but
that this eﬀect did not generalize to the mundane setting of
measuring one’s blood pressure. Implementation intentions, on
the other hand, improved adherence with the blood-pressure
measurement schedule, and follow-up analyses showed that this
improvement was most notable in those participants who were
most challenged by the prospective memory task (i.e., those with
limited task-switching abilities).
Adult Samples with Neurological Conditions
In addition to reduced frontal-lobe function, other clinical
and subclinical conditions are also known to be associated
with self-regulation problems and should thus beneﬁt from
the eﬀects of implementation intentions. For example, in a
study by Brandstätter et al. (2001, Study 1), opiate addicts
experiencing withdrawal were asked to write a CV for a
new job application before the end of the day. Half of the
participants furnished this goal with an implementation intention
(i.e., they planned out when and where to write the CV); the
other half (control condition) formed irrelevant implementation
intentions (when and where to eat lunch). Although all patients
were highly motivated to write the CV, no patient in the
control condition ﬁnished it in time. However, 80% of the
implementation intention participants succeeded in doing so.
Implementation intentions thus helped opiate addicts in a state
of withdrawal to translate their intentions into action despite
their presumed preoccupation with their cravings (i.e., high
cognitive load). Similar to this example, other critical samples
were also found to beneﬁt from planning with implementation
intentions: Schizophrenic patients responded faster to critical
numbers in a go/no-go task (Brandstätter et al., 2001, Study 2)
and young adults with schizotypal personality features performed
better on a prospective memory task (Chen et al., 2014).
Patients with multiple sclerosis (Kardiasmenos et al., 2008) as
well as memory-impaired individuals with neurological damage
(Grilli andMcFarland, 2011) improved their prospective memory
performance, and individuals with epilepsy (Brown et al., 2009)
and stroke survivors (O’Carroll et al., 2013) increased their
adherence to their medication schedules.
Samples of Children with ADHD
In addition to both younger and older adults, the eﬀectiveness
of implementation intentions in critical samples has also been
tested in children, speciﬁcally in children suﬀering from ADHD.
Children with ADHD ﬁnd it diﬃcult to control their impulses
and to delay immediate gratiﬁcation (Rodriguez et al., 1989). In a
study, Gawrilow et al. (2011a, Study 1) asked children diagnosed
with Hyperkinetic Disorder (F90.0, ICD-10; WHO, 1991) to play
a computerized delay-of-gratiﬁcation task in which they could
earn additional money by delaying their response. Each of the
40 task trials started with a red picture showing an animal or a
transport vehicle before a blue picture showing an animal or a
transport vehicle followed after 30, 40, 50, or 60 s. Children could
skip waiting for the blue picture by pressing a button at any time.
However, whereas they earned only one point (worth 5 ct) when
clicking in response to red pictures, they earned three points
(worth 15 ct) when clicking in response to blue pictures. Children
were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions.
One-third of the children received only the task instruction that
red pictures are worth one point and blue pictures are worth three
points. One-third of the children added the goal intention “I will
earn as many points as possible,” to this task instruction, and one-
third formed the goal intention and added the implementation
intention “Whenever a red picture appears, then I will wait for
the blue one.” Children then performed the task. In line with
previous research on ADHD and delay of gratiﬁcation, children
in the control condition were not very successful at waiting for
the blue picture, earning 3.35€; out of a possible 6€ on average.
Speaking to the limited power of goals to increase the delay of
gratiﬁcation, children who had formed the goal intention did
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the control group (they earned on
average 2.82€ out of 6€). However, children who had formed the
implementation intention managed to delay gratiﬁcation much
longer, earning close to the maximum 6€ possible (5.54€ on
average). Thus, even those most prone to impulsive behavior
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managed to curb their impulses and delay gratiﬁcation by
forming implementation intentions. Similarly, Gawrilow et al.
(2011b) also found that implementation intentions beneﬁt
executive functions (i.e., shifting, resistance to distraction) in
children with ADHD.
Summary
Studies with critical samples have provided converging evidence
that implementation intentions can be successfully formed,
maintained, and executed by people suﬀering from impaired
self-regulation. Implementation intention eﬀects were observed
under conditions of reduced frontal-lobe functionality, opiate
withdrawal, schizophrenia, epilepsy, prior strokes, multiple
sclerosis, neurological damage with memory impairment, and
ADHD. These ﬁndings from behavioral studies in critical samples
are also in accordance with the proposition that implementation
intentions automate action control by shifting from top–
down to bottom–up information processing. Self-regulation with
implementation intentions thus depends less heavily on frontal-
lobe processes and indeed requires fewer cognitive resources than
self-regulation with mere goals.
Studies with Physiological Measures
Although the ﬁndings from studies on cognitive processes and
those involving critical samples provide cumulative evidence of
the assumed implementation intention eﬀects and processes, the
paradigms used in these studies oﬀer only limited insights into
how a certain response or behavior comes about. Physiological
measures such as heart rate and cortisol level, analyses of
eye movements, and electrocortical and imaging measures
open new venues for the investigation of implementation
intention eﬀects. Neuroscientists have begun to explore what
implementation intention research can learn by using these
physiological measures, either as a central outcome measure or
as a complementary measure.
Cortisol and Heart Rate Studies
To examine whether implementation intentions improve
cognitive performance even under conditions of acute stress,
Scholz et al. (2009) manipulated participants’ stress levels and
their intentions regarding a subsequent go/no-go task. First,
they either formed an implementation intention or received
standard instructions on how to perform an upcoming go/no-go
task. Next, they either engaged in the Trier Social Stress Test
(Kirschbaum et al., 1993), which required them to give an
improvised speech that was videotaped, or they rested (control
condition). Finally, all participants worked on the go/no-go task.
To ensure that participants were indeed experiencing acute stress,
their cortisol levels and heart rates were measured after the stress
manipulation. Implementation intention and goal intention
participants exhibited equally elevated cortisol responses and
heart rates in response to the stress induction; consequently,
self-regulation capabilities should be equally impaired in the two
conditions. The responses in the go/no-go task showed that stress
induction led to worse performance in comparison to the control
condition. However, an interaction indicated that this eﬀect
only occurred in the goal intention condition; implementation
intention participants’ performance was unaﬀected by the
stress induction. This study exempliﬁes how implementation
intention research can apply physiological measures, not only as
primary outcome measures but also as complementary measures
to investigate how diﬀerent physiological states impact the
eﬀectiveness of implementation intentions.
Eye-Tracking Studies
A study by Stalbovs et al. (2015) is another good example of
how the measurement of physiological processes can contribute
to implementation intention research. The authors used eye-
tracking data to gain insight into how implementation intentions
facilitate multimedia learning. They observed that learners who
formed implementation intentions to integrate the information
presented in text paragraphs and picture elements looked back
and forth between the two representational formats more
frequently, and that these transitions predicted the subsequent
learning outcomes. This study also demonstrates how measuring
eye movements can complement behavioral measures in order
to increase our understanding of the processes underlying
implementation intention eﬀects.
Electrocortical Studies
High temporal resolution is required to investigate the temporal
dynamics of implementation intention eﬀects and to shed light
on the processes that take place before individuals initiate their
responses. Electroencephalography (EEG) records the electrical
activity along the scalp non-invasively and with a high temporal
resolution using electrodes. One challenge of EEGmeasures is the
diﬀerentiation between a response of interest (e.g., the emotional
response to seeing a picture) and various other processes taking
place at the same time (e.g., thinking of one’s vacation, wondering
what the study is about). In order to investigate the response to
a particular event (e.g., the emotional picture), EEG researchers
often rely on event-related potentials (ERPs). The main idea of
ERPs is to repeatedly create an event (e.g., repeatedly viewing
the emotional picture), record each electrical response, and
then calculate an average across all instances. Thereby, the
other processes that occur at random should average out across
measurements, rendering the “substrate” response to the event of
interest observable (Luck, 2014). The high temporal resolution of
such ERP measures allows the observation of cortical responses
that occur much earlier than behavioral responses (e.g., button
pressing) in the cognitive paradigms discussed above. Because
strategic response control by goal intentions needs “attentional
(eﬀortful) resources that take time to accrue” (Bargh and
Chartrand, 2000, p. 273), behavioral response time approaches
only directly measure eﬀects that occur at least 300 ms after
the stimulus onset. Thus, although response time approaches
can indirectly capture earlier processes (e.g., using the PRP
paradigm), only ERP measures can measure eﬀects occurring
immediately after the onset of a stimulus; they can therefore put
the immediacy hypothesis of implementation intention theory to
a critical test.
The P300 ERP component
One of the ERP components is the P300 in tasks measuring
inhibitory control (endogenous evaluation of response control
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and conﬂict monitoring) such as go/no-go tasks. In go/no-go
tasks, some types of stimuli (e.g., numbers) require a response,
whereas others (e.g., letters) do not. No-go stimuli have been
found to evoke higher P300 amplitudes than go stimuli. The
eﬀort to override the impulse to respond is thus reﬂected in
an elevated P300 response. This amplitude increase in response
to no-go stimuli is less pronounced in children with ADHD
(Fallgatter et al., 2004), which is in line with the observation
that children with ADHD experience diﬃculties with inhibiting
their responses. Building on these ﬁndings, several studies have
addressed the question of whether implementation intentions
can be used to improve response inhibition performance and
to increase the P300 response. Behavioral data shows that
implementation intentions indeed improve no-go performance
in children with ADHD (Gawrilow and Gollwitzer, 2008,
Studies 1 and 2). Paul et al. (2007) investigated whether
this behavioral change is also reﬂected in ERP data. Indeed,
replicating the earlier ﬁndings, if-then plans improved response
inhibition, and this improvement was also reﬂected in the ERPs:
implementation intentions increased the diﬀerences between go
and no-go trials in the ﬁrst half of the P300 (between 160
and 312 ms) in children with ADHD to such an extent that
they did no longer diﬀer from control children. As discussed
above, this early activation validates the strategic automaticity
created by implementation intentions and extends the response
inhibition ﬁndings from the behavioral studies. In the second
half of the P300 (312–452 ms), however, implementation
intentions reduced the amplitude in control participants, but
the amplitude remained high in participants with ADHD.
This ﬁnding suggests that implementation intentions reduced
the processing eﬀort in children without ADHD but not in
children with ADHD. It may be the case that implementation
intentions helped ADHD children to recognize the speciﬁed
situation (no-go signal), but that the inhibition of the
impulse to respond was still eﬀortful. In line with this
interpretation, the response times indicated that ADHD
children responded more slowly than control children, especially
in the planning condition. This interpretation is also in
accordance with behavioral studies that have demonstrated
that implementation intentions can improve the initiation
of reﬂective responses such as evaluating a chosen strategy
(Henderson et al., 2007), taking an onlooker’s perspective
(Wieber et al., 2015), and reviewing the pros and cons of diﬀerent
decision alternatives (Thürmer et al., 2015b). Overall, the study
by Paul et al. (2007) shows that implementation intentions can
aﬀect neural activity, as reﬂected in the ﬁrst half of the P300
component, and improve response inhibition in children with
ADHD.
The P100 ERP component
Another well-studied ERP component is the P100 in emotion
processing, a factor commonly interpreted as an indicator
of early visual perception that is beyond strategic control
by goal intentions (Rellecke et al., 2012). Schweiger Gallo
et al. (2009, Study 3; overview by Schweiger Gallo et al.,
2013) used such ERP measures to contextualize self-report
data. This self-report data indicated that the implementation
intention “And if I see a spider, then I will ignore it!”
enabled participants with chronic fear of spiders to better
control their fear in response to spider pictures than either
the mere goal intention “I will not get frightened” or viewing
the pictures without further instructions. According to the
ERP measures, only participants who bolstered their goal
intention to not get frightened with an ignore-implementation
intention exhibited signiﬁcantly reduced early activity in the
visual cortex in response to spider pictures, as reﬂected
in a smaller occipital P100 (assessed at 120 ms after a
spider picture was presented). This modiﬁcation of early
perceptual processes provides further evidence of the strategic
automation of the speciﬁed goal-directed response (here, an
ignore response) when the critical cue (here, a spider picture)
is encountered. Alternative explanations including diﬀerences
in ocular movements, commitment, and self-reported success
at not getting frightened could not account for these ﬁndings.
The observed eﬀects are therefore in line with the prediction
that implementation intentions allow more automatic emotion
regulation.
Imaging Studies
Although EEG research indicates that implementation intentions
can help control very early responses, the notion of strategic
automaticity also has implications with regard to the brain areas
involved. Because EEG only provides very limited insights into
the localization of neural activity, imaging techniques represent
a further promising approach for the investigation of the neural
correlates of implementation intention eﬀects. The strategic
automation of action control by implementation intentions
should also be reﬂected in the location of neural activity: It
should draw more on brain areas that are associated with
stimulus-guided, automatic bottom–up processing. To examine
the origins of implementation intention eﬀects, the high spatial
resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
oﬀers a useful approach. Using fMRI allows deriving a correlate
of the blood oxygen level in the brain (blood-oxygen-level
dependent, BOLD), which is usually interpreted as a sign of
activity (i.e., higher levels of activity are reﬂected in more
oxygen in the blood; e.g., Aguirre et al., 1998). Because fMRI
is commonly combined with high-resolution structural MRI
scans, one can locate this activity quite accurately. Recent fMRI
research indicates that diﬀerent kinds of action control use
diﬀerent brain regions. In general, while bottom–up, stimulus-
driven, or automatic action control is linked to more medial
regions (e.g., the orbitofrontal cortex, OFC or the medial rostral
prefrontal gyrus, medial Brodmann Area 10, BA 10), top–down,
deliberate control of response initiation seems to employ more
lateral areas (such as the dorsolateral prefrontal gyrus, DLPFC,
or the lateral BA 10; meta-analyses by Gilbert et al., 2006;
Diekhof et al., 2011; Buhle et al., 2014). The observation that
implementation intentions support stimulus-driven, automatic
action control therefore suggests that medial regions in the
frontal cortex should be more active during action control with
implementation intentions, and that lateral regions should be
more active during deliberate action control with mere goal
intentions.
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BOLD activity during emotion regulation
This idea has recently been tested in the context of emotion
regulation by Hallam et al. (2015). As discussed above,
implementation intentions have been shown to help regulate
emotions more eﬀectively and eﬃciently (i.e., modulating
even early perceptual responses). A recent fMRI study tested
whether this emotion regulation by implementation intentions
indeed originates in the medial prefrontal areas that have been
implicated in automatic emotion control (Etkin et al., 2011).
While in the scanner, participants viewed a number of disgusting,
sad, and neutral pictures. Before each of the emotional picture
trials, participants were either asked to merely view the picture
(“attend”) or were prompted to use one of two strategies to
regulate their emotional response: Adopting a detached and
unemotional attitude (“reappraise”) or attempting not to get
emotional (“suppress”). Implementation intention participants
had learned about these two strategies in an if-then format (“If
I see REAPPRAISE, then I will tell myself that ‘these are just
pixels on a screen and the picture can’t get to me!’ ” and “If I
see SUPPRESS, then I will block out all bad feelings and just stay
cool!”); control participants merely formed the respective goal
intentions (“When viewing pictures preceded by REAPPRAISE
you should adopt a detached and unemotional attitude” and
“Some picture will be preceded by the word SUPPRESS. When
viewing these pictures you should try to stop yourself from
getting emotional. In other words, try to suppress any feelings
you have when looking at the picture”). The results showed that,
as expected, implementation intentions employed the OFC, while
goal intentions activated the more lateral DLPFC and regions
outside the prefrontal cortex (Temporoparietal Junction, TPJ).
Going one step further, connectivity analyses demonstrated that
this implementation intention eﬀect resulted in lower amygdala
BOLD activity after participants viewed emotional pictures, a
ﬁnding that was in line with their self-reports (i.e., participants
reported less emotional responses in implementation intention
trials). These new data therefore tie in nicely with the behavioral
(Webb et al., 2012c) and electrocortical (Schweiger Gallo et al.,
2009) ﬁndings on emotion regulation using implementation
intentions discussed above.
BOLD activity during prospective memory tasks
Beyond emotion regulation, these diﬀerences between mere goals
and goals with implementation intentions should also be reﬂected
in the brain areas active during prospective memory for action
control. In particular, the BA 10 should be involved: Although
this medial prefrontal region is not yet well understood and
serves multiple functions (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al.,
2006; Van Overwalle, 2009; Denny et al., 2012), brain activity
in the medial BA 10 seems to be associated with bottom–
up (stimulus-initiated) prospective action, and brain activity
in the lateral BA 10 seems to be related to top–down (self-
initiated) prospective action (Burgess et al., 2007). Therefore,
if implementation intentions actually delegate action control to
external stimuli, the medial BA 10 should be involved in their
execution, and if goal intentions actually require deliberately
monitoring of the environment, they should employ the lateral
BA 10. Gilbert et al. (2009) tested this hypothesis in an fMRI
study in which participants had to perform a prospective memory
task on the basis of either goal or implementation intention
instructions. Acting on the basis of goal intentions was associated
with brain activity in the lateral rostral prefrontal cortex
(lateral BA 10), whereas acting on the basis of implementation
intentions was associated with brain activity in the medial
rostral prefrontal cortex (medial BA 10). Interestingly, although
implementation intention participants performed better in the
prospective memory task, overall they showed reduced brain
activation during task performance. This ﬁnding suggests that
action initiation by implementation intentions is indeed less
resource-intensive than action control by mere goal intentions
(e.g., Bayer et al., 2009), even in terms of the neural processes
involved. This interpretation also corresponds to the results
of the EEG study discussed above, in which implementation
intentions improved go/no-go performance while reducing brain
activity in control children (Paul et al., 2007). Given the
continuing advances in research on the functions of the BA 10,
future studies have a high potential to inform implementation
intention research and to inspire new hypotheses on how
if-then planning works. This exempliﬁes how physiological
studies can improve our understanding of intentional action
control and foster the conceptual and empirical integration
of research including the neural, cognitive, and behavioral
level.
Summary
We reviewed behavioral studies that applied physiological
measures to investigate the limits, processes, and eﬀects of
implementation intentions. High cortisol levels and increased
heart rates indicated the successful induction of acute stress,
which did not compromise implementation intention eﬀects.
Eye-tracking allowed quantiﬁcation of the enactment of the
visual action strategies (i.e., gaze transitions) that were speciﬁed
in implementation intentions and their mediating role with
regard to the behavioral eﬀects (i.e., multimedia learning).
Electrocortical studies showed that implementation intentions
aﬀect information processing as early as 120 ms (i.e., P100
activity) and 160–312 ms (i.e., ﬁrst half of the P300 activity)
after the stimulus onset. Finally, imaging studies observed
that action control by implementation intentions involves
more activity in brain regions that are associated with
bottom–up rather than top–down information processing.
Thus, although only a limited number of implementation
intention studies have applied physiological measures, the
reviewed studies provide complementary support for the
assumptions of implementation intention theory and new
insights into the timing and location of implementation intention
eﬀects.
Discussion
In this review, we examined behavioral and physiological studies
that oﬀer insights into how implementation intentions aﬀect the
translation of individuals’ intentions into action. We started by
reviewing research that documented the pervasiveness of the
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intention–behavior gap. We laid out the conceptual framework
of implementation intention theory and the processes that have
been postulated in research on implementation intentions. Next,
we reviewed studies on cognitive processes, studies involving
critical samples, and studies assessing physiological measures.
Studies on Cognitive Processes
The studies on cognitive processes employed a broad variety
of paradigms to examine speciﬁc aspects of the strategic
automation of action control by implementation intentions.
Findings from priming paradigms provide support for the
process assumptions of implementation intention theory,
namely that if-then planning increases the accessibility of
the critical cue and strengthens the link between the mental
representations of the cue and response. Data from dual-task
paradigms and priming paradigms show that action control
by implementation intentions is characterized by features of
automaticity; the response initiation is eﬃcient, immediate,
and no further conscious intent is required once the critical
situation is encountered. Moreover, ﬁndings from attention
paradigms such as the dichotic listening task, ﬂanker task, and
PRP paradigms demonstrate that implementation intentions
aﬀect even early perceptual and attentional processes and
cannot be easily controlled. Prospective memory paradigms
have also been employed to investigate implementation
intention eﬀects. These studies have found that implementation
intentions can improve prospective memory; however, this
improvement comes at the cost of performance in secondary
tasks, suggesting that action control by implementation
intentions can automatically initiate responses but that their
execution may still rely on controlled processes. Finally,
behavioral studies also observed that implementation intentions
can be used to control automatic eﬀects, as measured in priming
paradigms, implicit attitude tests, and behavioral measures.
Although the overall ﬁndings on the cognitive processes
underlying implementation intentions are fairly consistent,
they also indicate potential venues for future research. For
example, the concepts that have been used to understand
the cognitive processes involved (i.e., priming, automaticity,
selective attention, and memory) originate from diﬀerent
research traditions (i.e., social psychological and cognitive
science); accordingly, the conceptual and empirical overlap
between these ﬁelds should be further promoted. Moreover,
future research could follow up on the reported ﬁndings by
examining the moderators of the automaticity of implementation
intention eﬀects on prospective memory as well as on other
performance domains.
Studies with Critical Samples
Implementation intention eﬀects were also found in critical
samples that suﬀer from impaired self-regulation. The
investigated samples included individuals with reduced
frontal-lobe functions, schizophrenia, epilepsy, a history
of stroke, multiple sclerosis, memory impairment, and
neurological damage, as well as opiate addicts and children
with ADHD. The ﬁndings are consistent with the proposition
that implementation intentions automate action control by
shifting from top–down to bottom–up information processing
as outlined in implementation intention theory. However, the
studies on implementation intention eﬀects on prospective
memory in community-dwelling older adults were not
conclusive with regard to the role of individuals’ executive
functions. Whereas one study observed implementation
intention eﬀects for older adults with high executive functions
(McFarland and Glisky, 2011), three studies (Lengfelder
and Gollwitzer, 2001; Brom and Kliegel, 2014; Brom et al.,
2014) observed the strongest implementation intention eﬀects
for older adults with limited executive function. Future
research could systematically explore the variables that
moderate implementation intention eﬀects for older adults
with high executive function in greater detail. For example,
depending on the task there might be ceiling eﬀects that
prevent implementation intentions from further improving
individuals’ prospective memory performance. With respect to
the behavioral paradigms that have been applied in these studies,
the studies exhibited substantial overlap with the behavioral
studies on the cognitive processes of implementation intention
eﬀects. However, they also applied speciﬁc measures to assess
individuals’ executive functions in the critical samples (e.g.,
frontal-lobe function, ﬂuid mechanics, switching abilities,
and response inhibition). Such measures may also serve to
complement behavioral studies with physiological data, thus
integrating the diﬀerent areas of research on implementation
intentions.
Studies using Physiological Measures
Whereas a large number of behavioral studies have examined
the cognitive processes of implementation intention eﬀects
and critical samples, only a few have used physiological
approaches. These latter studies point to the usefulness of
such complementary approaches. The physiological measures
implemented allowed precise exploration of the contextual limits
and processes: by using physiological measures including cortisol
levels, heart rates, and eye movements, studies demonstrated that
acute stress does not impede implementation intention eﬀects
on performance and that implementation intentions referring
to visual attention indeed improved multimedia learning
performance by aﬀecting individuals’ eye movements. Moreover,
electrocortical and imaging studies allowed exploration of
the timing and location of implementation intention eﬀects.
EEG studies observed that implementation intentions deﬁnitely
aﬀect early information processing, as indicated by changes
in P100 and P300 activity. Using fMRI, studies also showed
that implementation intentions aﬀect the spatial location of
action-control processes. Whereas emotion regulation with
implementation intentions was more strongly associated with
the activation of brain areas previously reported to be involved
in automatic emotion regulation, emotion regulation with goal
intentions was associated with those previously reported to
be involved in eﬀortful emotion regulation. With regard to
implementation intention processes, improved cue detectionmay
be reﬂected in the increased activation of the right inferior
frontal gyrus and ventroparietal cortex, and the cue-response
link may be reﬂected in the more eﬀective modulation of the
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left amygdala, as well as the coupling of the OFC and the
amygdala. In contrast, emotion regulation with goal intentions
resulted in increased activity in the more dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and regions outside the prefrontal cortex (TPJ), as well
as more amygdala activity in response to viewing emotional
pictures.
The observation that action control by implementation
intentions involves more activity in the medial rostral prefrontal
cortex and less in the lateral rostral prefrontal cortex is
in line with the strategic automation assumption, as it
suggests that action control by implementation intentions is
indeed less eﬀortful than action control by goal intentions.
Building on the ﬁnding that implementation intentions aﬀect
emotion regulation processes as well as behavior regulation,
various directions seem interesting for future research. For
example, the physiological correlates of diﬀerent types of
implementation intentions (such as task-facilitating versus
distraction-inhibiting implementation intentions) could be
explored. Additionally, heart rate and cortisol measurements
and eye-tracking could be utilized not only as complementary
measures but also as direct outcome measures. Further research
could investigate whether action control by implementation
intentions can be used to regulate heart rate and cortisol
levels. For instance, implementation intentions addressing
individuals’ emotion regulation could be applied to alter eﬀort-
related physiological adjustments during task performance. In
general, motivation has been demonstrated to be systematically
linked to cardiovascular responses (Wright and Gendolla,
2012). Motivation eﬀects are inﬂuenced by mood states,
such that sadness primes processed during task performance
lead to stronger cardiovascular responses than happiness
or anger primes (Gendolla, 2012). Thus, implementation
intentions directed at reducing negative aﬀect or at eliciting
positive aﬀect during task performance should reduce these
mood-induced changes in cardiovascular responses (e.g., heart
rate, cardiac pre-ejection period, or systolic blood pressure).
Similarly, implementation intentions that focus on eﬀective stress
management (e.g., Storch et al., 2007) should result in reduced
cortisol levels.
Methodological Considerations
Overall, the results of the studies on cognitive processes,
those involving critical samples, and those implementing
physiological measures provide convergent support for the
process assumptions of implementation intention theory. These
ﬁndings also oﬀer ﬁrst illustrations of how these methods
complement each other; they address our research question of
how implementation intention eﬀects arise more eﬀectively and
comprehensively than either method on its own. Depending
on the research question, studies have applied either multiple
behavioral or physiological measures or a combination of the
two. For instance, Aarts et al. (1999) measured the accessibility
of the mental representation of the cue speciﬁed in the if-part
(i.e., cognitive process measure) and subsequently observed
whether participants remembered to collect a coupon (i.e.,
behavior). Schweiger Gallo et al. (2009, Study 3) combined self-
report measures of emotions with ERP measures in order to
examine how neurophysiological activity relates to participants’
subjective emotional experiences. Hallam et al. (2015) went
one step further, analyzing how diﬀerent brain areas impact
one another: they found that implementation intention eﬀects
originated in the OFC and resulted in reduced amygdala
activity. Again, this change in brain activity was reﬂected in
participants’ self-reported emotions. These researchers also used
skin conductance response measures to analyze physiological
responses to the emotional stimuli. Interestingly, the neural
and self-report changes in emotion were not reﬂected in
skin conductance response changes (i.e., no diﬀerences in
skin conductance between conditions were observed). This
observation is well in line with the common ﬁnding that
diﬀerent measures of emotions are not always coherent and
therefore cannot replace each other (e.g., Russell, 2003; Mauss
et al., 2005; reviews by Mauss and Robinson, 2009; Reisenzein
et al., 2013), which further supports our argument that a
multi-method approach to the intentional control of action is
necessary. Such a multi-method approach would also allow the
investigation of the assumption that implementation intention
eﬀects are dependent on the activation of the superordinate goal
(Gollwitzer, 1999). Although initial support for this assumption
has been found in behavioral studies (Sheeran et al., 2005),
combining behavioral measures with ERP or fMRI measures
would provide amore diﬀerentiated test of this moderation eﬀect.
Given the broad variety of behavioral and physiological measures
that implementation intention research has already successfully
applied, we are conﬁdent that future studies on implementation
intention processes and eﬀects can easily tailor their methods to
test their speciﬁc research hypothesis and further advance this
vibrant ﬁeld of research.
Moreover, diﬀerent brain-imaging techniques may be
combined to analyze source-eﬀect relations (e.g., EEG and
fMRI data; Ullsperger and Debener, 2010), and methodological
advances in the ambulatory measurement of brain/body
imaging might also permit researchers to synchronously
record participants’ motor behavior, brain activity, and other
physiological aspects, as well as their physical environment
and external events (research topic by Gramann et al.,
2014). Although the joint multistream analysis of recorded
mobile brain/body imaging data poses major conceptual,
mathematical, and data-processing challenges, this development
would allow a more comprehensive integration of the
diﬀerent methods as well as a more complex examination
of (social-)psychological phenomena such as joint attention
(Wykowska et al., 2014) and intentional action control
during negotiations (Trötschel and Gollwitzer, 2007), thereby
making substantial contributions to implementation intention
research.
In addition to the combination of diﬀerent measures, new
methods can be applied to address questions on the eﬀectiveness
of implementation intentions. For example, computational
modeling (e.g., Hübner et al., 2010) and advanced mouse-
tracking analytic techniques (Hehman et al., 2014) represent
promising opportunities to advance our understanding of
implementation intention processes and to link cognitive
processes and behavior. Moreover, steady-state visual evoked
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potentials (ssVEPs) may be used to trace how visual stimuli are
processed (Keil et al., 2003; Perlstein et al., 2003). As this method
can simultaneously observe the processing of two competing
stimuli, it might permit analysis of the perceptual processes
involved in the link between the if-cues and the then-responses
of an implementation intention in sequential priming paradigms
(e.g., Webb and Sheeran, 2007).
Conceptual Considerations
The ﬁndings on the physiological processes underlying
implementation intention eﬀects might also be used to reﬁne
the concepts used in implementation intention research. In
fact, various eﬀorts are currently underway. For example,
Martiny-Huenger et al. (in press) have suggested an embodied
cognition perspective to further our understanding of how
implementation intention eﬀects come about. They argue
that forming an if-then plan leads to more eﬃcient action
when the activity patterns during planning resemble the
activation patterns during plan execution (pattern-overlap
principle). This perspective links research on implementation
intentions with research on motor processes. This might be
especially interesting, as rules and task sets often take the
form of if-then plans. Thus, implementation intentions could
potentially contribute to speed-up eﬀects in rule conditions
relative to no-rule conditions (e.g., Randerath et al., 2013,
2014).
Similar eﬀorts to foster the conceptual and empirical
integration of cognitive and physiological approaches are
ongoing in other areas as well, including cognition–motivation
interactions (e.g., Braver et al., 2014), prospective memory
(Cona et al., 2015b), the understanding of intentions (e.g.,
Chiavarino et al., 2012), group processes and intergroup
relations (Forbes, 2014), and priming eﬀects (e.g., Lerner and
Shriki, 2014; Tartaglia et al., 2015). These approaches may
also be helpful in deriving hypotheses on how implementation
intentions aﬀect neurophysiological processes and in further
integrating the diﬀerent research areas. For example, given
the control of priming eﬀects by implementation intentions,
ﬁndings on the neurophysiological correlates of priming
eﬀects that have been identiﬁed using EEG (Holcomb,
1988; Holcomb and Neville, 1990; Swick, 1998; Rossell
et al., 2003; Franklin et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2007; Du
et al., 2014; van Vliet et al., 2014) and fMRI measures
(Henson, 2003; Henson and Rugg, 2003; Rossell et al., 2003)
could be used to derive further hypotheses regarding the
neurophysiological correlates of implementation intention
eﬀects.
Implications for Research on the Formation
and Maintenance of Implementation Intentions
Finally, the present review only examined the execution of
implementation intentions. In addition to investigating the
consequences of having formed implementation intentions,
future research might also examine the processes occurring
during the formation and maintenance of implementation
intentions (see Cona et al., 2015a). For example, the formation
of diﬀerent kinds of intention formation strategies has been
assessed using continuous magnetoencephalographic (MEG)
activity (Achtziger et al., 2009). In their study, Achtziger
et al. (2009) examined the self-regulation strategy to mentally
contrast one’s desired positive future with the obstacles in one’s
present reality (Oettingen et al., 2001). This self-regulation
strategy has been found to foster the formation of strong
goal intentions and to sucessfully improve goal attainment
(overviews by Oettingen, 2012; Oettingen et al., 2013). As
mental contrasting should be cognitively more demanding
than indulging in mindless daydreaming, increased activity in
prefrontal, frontal, parietal, and temporal areas was expected and
found. These activity patterns indicate that mental contrasting
does indeed involve strong intention formation, working
memory, and episodic memory. Moreover, the heightened
activity of occipital areas during mental contrasting compared
to resting and indulging suggests that mental contrasting
involves the purposeful creation of mental images. These
ﬁndings are in line with studies on cognitive processes that
have found that mental contrasting energizes goal pursuit and
establishes strong associations between mental representations
of the future and the obstacles, as well as between the mental
representations of the obstacles and the means to overcome
them (Kappes et al., 2012, 2013; Kappes and Oettingen,
2014).
This overlap between neurophysiological and cognitive
approaches in research on intention formation corresponds with
the overlap of these approaches observed in the intentional
control of action by implementation intentions. Moreover,
intention formation has been shown to impact the breadth of
visual attention (Büttner et al., 2014). Using an eye-tracker,
Büttner et al. (2014, Study 3) demonstrated that participants
who had thought about how to act on a self-set goal (i.e.,
who were in an implemental mindset, which is active after an
intention has been formed) subsequently focused on central
objects in front of natural backgrounds (e.g., a train in front
of mountains) more often than participants who had thought
about whether they should commit themselves to a goal or not
(i.e., who were in a deliberative mindset, which is active before
an intention has been formed). Thus, the activation of cognitive
procedures that deal with weighing the pros and cons of a
potential goal was associated with a more balanced exploration
of a visual scene, whereas the activation of cognitive procedures
that deal with the translation of one’s intentions into action was
associated with a visual exploration biased toward the central
object.
Conclusion
The present review examined the status quo of the physiological
research on implementation intentions and highlighted
potential directions for future research. Although the number
of physiological studies on implementation intention eﬀects
is still small, these studies already provide new insights
into the temporal distribution and spatial location of these
eﬀects. Moreover, the initial physiological ﬁndings are in
line with behavioral research on cognitive processes and
involving critical samples, as well as the assumption that
implementation intentions indeed strategically automate the
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intentional control of action. These ﬁndings and recent advances
in conceptualization, modelling, analysis, and physiological
and cognitive methods are encouraging, and we hope to see
more research linking behavioral, cognitive, and physiological
perspectives that will further improve our understanding of how
implementation intentions support action control.
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